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The Department of  the  Common  Market  Commission  for  which  I  am regpons-
ible  is  known as the  rrDirectorate-General  for  Competitiontt.  Many of  our
American visitors  refer  to  it  as the  Commissionrs itanti-trustil  departnent,
and sone of  my British  friend.s  have called  it  the  "Monopolies and restric-
tite  practicesl  d.epartnent.  But  for  myself,  I  prefer  the  word.  "Competitionrf.
In  thisr  I  am  not  just  following  the  peculiar  euphemisrn  which  leads  some
legislative  bodies,  for  example, to  call  a particularly  repressive  pieoe
of  legislation  "The Liberty  of  the  Subject  (Regulation)  Act",  or  to  label
press  oensorship  ttthe Freedom  of  Speech (Autfrorization)  Bill',.  Nor do I
wish  simply  to  enlarge  the  scope of  my orvn  work  and that  of  my staff.  The
reason,  in  fact,  for  the  sonewhat peculiar  title  is  to  be found on the  one
hand in  the  Rone Treaty  ancl in  the  clear  intentions  of  those  by whorn  it
was drafted.  ancl signecl,  and on the  other  hantl in  the  fact  that  the  Execu-
tive  Connisslon of  the  Common  Market has charged me not  only  to  d.eal with
anti-trust  problems, but  also  with  the harmonisation of  legislation,  with
fisca1prob1ems'withdumpingwithintheCommon},{arketandwithStatesub-
.sidies. 
Quite  a philosophy  lies  behind this  decision.
The European Economic Community -  and perhaps you  have heard  this
more than  once already  I  -  is  not  sinply  an attenpt  at  free  trade  wifhin
a  custons union.  Rather,  it  takes  the  classical  aig  of  free  trad.e and
seeks to  fulfi}l  it  as conpletely  as possible.  f  am  sure that  f  do not
need. to  renind  so tlistinguished.  an audience  that  the  aisl  in  questlon  is
in  the  first  place  that  of  greater  produrtivity,  achieved. by a greater
degree of  international  spdoialization  and d,ivision  of  labour,  spurred
in  turn  by greater  conpetition.  At  the  same  time  competition  should, see
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to  it,  that  the consulner  also  gets his  share of  the benefits  of  the
increased productivity,  in  the forrn of  lower prices.  competition,  in
other  rvord's,  is  one of  the  concepts that  lie  at  the heart  of  the Rome
Treatyi'and  the means  chosen to  reach it  ar.e-the:  approxirnation of  the
national  markets of  the  mernber  countries  as nearLy as possible  to  the
conditions  of  one singlerrhome  marketr, such as exists,  for  instance,
in  the  United  Kingdonr or  -  on a larger  scale  -  in  the  United. ijtates,
lYithin 
lhis  ]a'rge 
'rhome  markettr, or  common  market,  there  must not  only
be.free  trade;  there  must be also  the other  attributes  of  a  rrhome  narketr
-  that  is,  free  movement  of  labour,  free  movr:ment  of  capital,  free  moqe-
ment of  services.  tnlhat  is  morer 4ot  only  the  classioql- obstacles  to
such fleedon  must be rernoved.. rt  is  not  enough simply  to  remove customs
barriers.and  quota restrictions.  In  the  nod.ern  world., many  other  forms
.of  bamier  can divide  a market:  state  subsidies  of  various  kind.s; publio
and'  private  nonopolies,  price  regulations;  fiscal  measures; an6 ententes
and' agreements,  which  nay hav.e  as  their  main object  ilre  d.ivision,  the
carving-up,  of  the  large  trhome-market'r. Seen only  fron  the  point  of ,view
of  ac.hieving and maintaining  such a  frccnrnon  marketr,  therefore,  cornpeti-
tion  is  essential.  And r  need not  remind you that  there  are  other  reasons
too  fo.r insisting  on competition  as an essential  dynamic elenent  in  a
free  and prod.uctive economy.  There are  other  basic  concepts in  the  treaty,
like  comluon  responsi.bility  and solidarity.  Foreign  trade  policy,  the  coor-
dination  of  general  economic and.  monetary policies  of  member  countries,
social  policy,  policy  for  und,erdeveloped  regions. and,  to  a certain  extent,
agricultural  policyrand  transport  policy  aro  based on those other  basic
concepts;  but  thosc.topics  f  shalI  not  treat
l'  I  nay  alread.y  seom to  have wandered.  a  little  fron  my brief,  to  have
been betrayed  into  an irrc'levant  statement  of  principle.  But  I  hope that
you will  bear with  me.  trtor, in  my view,  it  is  only  by bearing  in  minil the
essential  principle  of  the  Rourc  Treaty,  which is  the  prinoiple  of  competi-
tion,  that  wc can find.  oo"  rr*f  in  what  is  a ve\ry complicated  story.
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NIr. Chairman, a wellknown Dutch economist once claimad  that  ht:
could. summarise  in  16 pages all  the  essentials  of  political  eoonomy.
And'  hc d.id.  Unfortunatcly,  beforc  anyone could  und.crstand"  thosc  16
pagcsr he.had to write  a furthi,r  200 peges of  cxplanation.  .So you know
vrhat to  oxpoct  if  I  now say that  I  think  nost  of  thc  substantive  provi-
sions  of  the  Rom,,'  Treaty  containing  etrict  rules  can be summed  up in
four  principles,  To bc morLr  explicit,  theri, ar;  about 1]0 provisions  of
the  Ronc Treaty  which havc tha  character  of  substantive  law.  About ?0 of
thom d'oal with  thc  other  topics  I  spok..r  of .  Often,  their  obligations,
although  v-.iry important  from  the  polltica1  point  of  vierv,  are  lcss  speci-
fically  binding  from the  l-gal  point  of  vicw.  But in  addition  to  these,
thcro  arc  about 50 articlcs  which arJ.  more spccifieally  bind.ing.  It  is
of  these that  I  wish  to  spcak. Th--ir essential  basis,  I  think,  can be re-
d.uccd.  to  th;  following  four  principlos  3
Fir*,  u-xisting  rcstrictions  on competition  betwccn ii{crnber  States  are
baing  gradually  climinatcd..
Seco+d.Iy,  mcasures takcn  by $Ionbcr States  or  by i.ndustry  whereby the
ind.ustry  of  onc lvlenber  State  is  artificially  favourcd  or  hind.ered.  in  com-
patition  rvith  that  of  another  Mernbr,-r  Statc  (d.iscrimination  and other  dis-
tortions  of  cornpetition,  as we rnay  call  them) are  being  giradually  elini-
nated. or  brought  into  line.
Thir4LL  rrclY  ru'strictions  on competition  or  d.istortions  of  conpeti-
tion  are  forbiticli;n.  /
Fou-l:Ltt-ly,  thc'sc  first  threo  prinoiplcs  appty  irrespoctive  of  ttp  ltegal
form  assumed.  by tho  neasures to  which  the  refer.
First,  thcnl  & r/ord  about  existing  f9G-qttg11g-j1i-sgryoti-!!-gg.  In
sone respects,  the Treatyrs  words on this  subjcct  are comparatively clear-
cut.  This  is  partly  becausey  at  the nonent,  the most inportant  obstacles
to  conpetition  aru  customs dutir:s,  Article  lJ  of  the  Treaty  lays  down that
custome dutios  on imports  atrd taxes  having  equivalont  effect  shall  bu
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abolished  in  stagcs which arc. specified  in  thc  follorving  articlcs.
Artiele  l6  colitains  similar  provision  for  customs  duties  and taxes on
exports.  Quantitative  restrictions  on imports,  &nd mcasuro.s  of  equivalent
effectr  fall  under Articlc'  50;  similar  r\-'strictions  on cxports  falI  under
Articlo  ,4.  Article  !!  provides for  the freeing  of  servj.ces, Article  6J
for  tho freeing  of  calrital,  Article  52 and succe.ed.ing  artioles  for  thc
froeing  of  thc  right  of  establishrnent of  nationals  of  other  Momber  states.
Such ar-  the  classical-  atrcl  obvious  public  barriers  which,  I  may ad.d, are
the  particular  concerlt of  one of  rny  French colleagues  and friend.s  on the
staff  of  tht;'commissj.on.  But other  pubtic  barriers  to  be reckoned  vrith -
if  not  necessarily  in  each case to  be abolishorl -  incLud.e  frontier  control
on importcd. good's  based on national  regulations  for  the  quality,  composi-
tion,  or  format  of  the  product,  natioiral  protection  based.  on patcnt  1aw,
copyright  law,  fisoal  moasures, etc.
At  the  present  stage of  the  Common  Market,  whcn import  6uties  havc
so far  bcln  cut  by only  20 per c-nt,  thesc public  obstacles  are still  the
most important  barl.iers  to  inter-State  compctition.  private  barriers,  for
example international  markct-shari.ng agrecm;nts,  still  play  a  fairly  mod,est
role  by  conparison  vrith  that  they  occupy witlhin  any particular  Mcrnbar  Statel
Legally  speakingr-  purc:ly 1oca1, regi.onal,  or  national  ententcs of  this  kind.
a,r..  not  affectcd. by the  Treaty  of'Romc unless  ttrey threatcn  to  restrict
trade  bctwecn Monber  States.  In  practice,  howcver, it  seems  likely  that
the  operation  of  ther Conmon  Markot -  or  of  what has been calleil  rrthe norma-
tive  force  of  facts'r  -  wiLl  increasingly  affcct  such rcgional  ententes as
thc  national  trade  barrj-c:'s  fall.  As competition  from other  Member  States
incrcases,  a national  or  rcgional  cartcl  will  find. it  hardc.r and.  hard.er to
operate  against  its  competitors  frorn othcr  Comnunity countrios,  and one
vrould.  oxpoct  it  eithcr  to  d.issolvc  (*"  its  m+mbers  securLr  their  indivitiual
interests  by price  cutting  or  invaciing  thcir  partnersrmarkets)  or  to seek
a modus  vivend.i.  rvith  ont.,rprises  in  other  Cornmunity  countrlcs.  Alreacly,  in
factr  some  attcmpts  aro  being  mad.e  to  eountcr. thc  falling  of  national
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tradc' barriers  by thc  croction  of  intcrnational  cartrrls,  But hcrc  th*.
Troaty  of  Romo  is  opcrativo:  and thc  Commission  of  the  Cornrnon  Market is
kooping a closc rvatch  on ilrc dovolopment  of  any such price*fixing  or
marktlt-sharing arrangom:nts.  In  such matters,  prcvontj-on is  bctter  than
cuxe.
So rnuch,  for  thc  moment,  for  restrictions  on conpotition.  Sccond.ly,
vrhat  about  gi-rczufge-ri-9.!__eld_qjjj9.lllons.€__qo.gpgjili-oJ.  ?  Am I.  risht
in  thinking  I  dctect  among  thc distinguishcd  lawyers presont hers today
a faint  shivu'r of  anticipatud  controvensy as I  say thosu vrords "distor-
tion  of  comp'ltition'r?  This  is  a notion  morc r.;plctc'*ittr  1cga1 d.iffi-
culty  than tho noti-on ,discrimination,r,  and, in  fact,  ogr approach to  it
in  practice  vrill  bc hi.ghly empirical.  Clcarly,  thero would be no point
in  rcmovlng tradi'  barriers  if  competitivc  conditions  were precisely  oqual
in  all  rcspects  throughout the  Community. There would not,  in  those cir-
cumstances, bc evcn any point  in  trad.c within  thc  area.  It  would.  morely
be a cas:  of  bringing  coals  to  N.:wcastlc -  coals  of  exactly  thc  saure  qua-
1ity,  exactly  the same  price,  exactly  thc  samc  dimonsions.  some  people
may feel  that  this  is  a  situation  already  achievcd. in  the  cigarette  ind.ust-
ry...  For thls  rcason,  elimination  of  'rd.istortiontt must not  be held. to
nean thc  climination  of  all  dispa{L-tjlps in  compctitivc  cond.itions:  a1lo-
wance must bo matle  for  a de'grec of  di.fferencc  j.n geographical  situation,
human  capacities,  levels  of  technical  progress and.  productivity,  and so on.
lYhere, then,  is  the  Line  to  bc d.rawn  ?  I  think  that  we may have guidbnce
in  Article  )2,  which d.cals with  a specific  typc  of  govcrnmcntal action
favouring  national  industry  and vrhich cxpressly  distinguishes  betwe€rr  [l]-
oqual  condltions  of  competition  in  certain  branches of  the  economy  or  cer-
tain  entcrprisc's,  and those vrhich affcct  lndustry  as a whole.  The forner
arc  to  b.  eliminated  or  approximateci..  Thc latter  -  and thrymight  welt  in.-
clud'e thc  8aneral  level  of  fiscal  and,  social  chargc's -  nu.ed  not,  in  as far
as exohangc ratcs  compensato  for  them.  This  distinction  vould  seonn  to
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accord with  thu  goneral  tonor  of  thc  Treaty  ancl  ite  caution  on guch
ncarly  politioal  mattors.  Sinci-.  prescnt  exchange rates  may ba consid.erd.
a fairly  faithful  reflection  of  gcriv\r'.?,I  cost  and price  lcvels  ers.between
thc  Community  countries,  the  prc-cond.ition  (tfrat  exchange rates  should
be realistic)  is  more important  as thc  illustration  of  a principle  than
&s & practical  issuc  at  the mom.:nt
Leaving  asid.e for  the  moment  thc  d-istinction  bctween 'td.isparity'f
and trd.istortionrr,  or  between t'natural"  and t8,rtificial"  clifferences  in  com-
'pctitivc 
cond.itions,, 1.:t me turn  from thc  bordorline  (which wilt  perhaps
be demarcated  by futuro  vordicts  -in the  Court of  Justice)  to  somo  of  thc
examples  of  ild.iscriminationI  and "distortionil  on which thc  Treaty  itself
is  fairly  spc'cific'  Let  me  flrst  spuak about forbiddcn  forms of'diecri-
urination.  The legal  concept of  cliscrirnination  in  the  Trcaty  of  Rome  is
tlif'ferent  fromt  the notion  of  d.istor"tion. -Whcreas  the notion  of  distortion
deals with  disparities  of  legislation  or  other  measures  as bctvreen  diffe-
rent  Menber  Statcs,  the notion  of  discrimination  deals with  unequal condi-
tions  of  competition,  existing  in  one Menber  state.
Onu of  the  most i'mportant  provisions,  in  this  """pn"i,  is  thG:.  prohi-
bition,  in  Articlo  J of  the Treaty,  of  'rany  d.iscrimina.tion on the groirnds
of  nationalii,yr'-  a ganeral  prohibition  which is  spccifically  applied  to
mattcrs  of  taxation  and.  right  of  cstablishment,  forinstance,  by later
Articles  of  the Treaty.  Articlcs  !2  and 59 and thosc that  follow'them
provid.e that. equal  legal  cond.itions  in  all  r..lu.vaflt respects  shall  be
applicd  to nationals  of  all  six  countrics  in  any one of  thr: six  courrtrios.
Fhereas  these articles  provicl.e  for  rul-es of  implemrntation,  Article'  J  only
pr.ovides for  the  possilility  of  funplen;nting  rcgulations  -  vrhich would
soen to. imply  that  this  article  alroady  has thc  force  of  law its.,If.
Articl-  85 forbid.s  d.iscriminatory  agrccmcnts and conccrted. actions  which
affect  international  tradi,"  but  only  when tlrcy  ind.ecd rcsult  in  competitive
d.isadvantage for  ono of  the  partics  concerned:  an example might  bc an export
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u'ntente  enfol'cing  doubl"c pricir:g  -  onii  pric,:  at  horr,,  another  in  a  fellorv
triombcr Stat.'.  Articlc  86  -  forbidding  nisuse  of  a  d.ominant markot  posi-
tionr  iu  so  far  as  it  affects  trade  b-^irlcsn l,ilcnber  Statcs  -  nay  also  be
taltan  to  cover  discrininatory  priccs  and  condj.tions  of  d.elivery.  Art.  91
provides  for  antj.-dunping  mJssur;s  i  *  *p-'"ific  forn  of  price-d,iscrimina-
tion  ov':h lvithout  a  narkot-dominati::g  position  or  a  cartal-zgrJoftBht.
Tho  first  exampl-;'of  rugl  trdistortion",  on  the  other  hand., seems to
bo Article  92,  which  ginerally  forbS-ds Stil,tc  aid.s  that  "d.istortrr  compe-
tition  and  cffect  tradc  biit.v--en  lle:ab,,r St:tas.  Articles  I00  and. IOI  pro-
vid.c  for  thc  harmonj-sation  of  natj.ona.l  l:gislation,  th;  forme-r 1n  all
cil,scs wh...ro it  dircctly  affects  ihe  coemon market,  the  lattcr-  only  if  it
d,istorts  conpetition.  llorli  in  both  f,i.sid,s has  al,r-ad,y begun:  on  the  pro-
tc.ction  of  industri-al  propcrty  .  {patcnis,  trad*  marks,  and  nod.ols  ) ;  on
foodstuffs  and  othcr  1-gislation  ithere  th;re  ar-  disparitj.es  as  regard.s
thc  quallty  or  the  conposition  of  products;  on  the  regulations  for  narkets
$hcrc  public  ag-ncies  act  as  buyers;  on  turnovcr  taxesi  and  on  the  cn-
forccmcnt  in  all  l{cmber  States  af  decisions  reaehed. by  a  eourt  in  any
Mernbor Statc.  0n1y  rrihen  dispariti-s  of  1--gis}ation  espucially  affect  the
prod.uction-costs  of  sp;cific  industries,  e3r! onr) speak  of  I'distortionrt
in  thc  sensc  in  which  i-t  is  uscd  iu  ihc  $paak-Report.  It  is  too  early
to  s&Ir  whethcr  thc  Court  cf  Justice  eiil  accupt  an  interprctation  of
this  notion,  that  gous  furthcr  than  this.
ft  is  casy  tc  sc.c hoi?cvu-l', that  particular  cascs  will  greatly  affect
the  conccpt  of  'rdistortion'f  .  Sosc j.l:te:rcsting  examples  can  alread.y  be
.guoted.  In  onc  casi.,  favorabl-  fiscel  tr+at*ent  for  d.cprcciati-on  of
capital  goods  was not  dcemed.  tc  b'  in  its"lf  an  aid  resulting  in  di-stor-
tione  buc&1rsc.  it  was  of  gen+ral  applici:tion  to  thu. whol..: econoEy.  But
it  ggg  considored  to  consti-tute  en  i:id.ircct  aid,  distorting  competition,
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for  tha  capital. 6ioods'industry of  th.: country lvhich e1:p1i.:cl  it,  since
it  was applicablo  only  for  capital  goods vrhich  hild bccr ordcrcd.  frorn
that  indust}y,  63iving thc  industry  comp-titiv.  acivantagq  ovcr  1ts  conpe-
titors  in  othur  }iarnbur  Stat.s.  A scconcl  cxamplo  is  the questi-on  of  1o-
gal  protu'ction  for  inclustrial  prop,_.jrty.  This  w.. bclievc  should  b.r harmo_
nised' throug'hout thc  Cominunity  -  not  only  bccauso  linitation  of  patents
etc.  to  a national  narkct  rvoulcl  l:-g!-+s-!  conpcti.tlon  betwcen statcs,
but  also  bi:causo thc  d'u'grcc  ovcn of  national  protection  afforded  by
national  lcgislation  differs  widcly  from country  to  country,  so that
ind.ustries  ar*  vrorking in  very  <liffcrent  or'td.istortcd.'r  compctitive
conditions.  rn  the  case of  foodstuffs,  d.i-ffcrcncJs in  lcgislation  again
not  only  fimii  conp.rtition  bctvrccn  Statcs,  but  also  disLgrt  it  in  so far
as thcy  subrnit thc  netional  f'oodstuff  s ind.ustrics  to un.qual  obligations,
which in  turn  affoct  th-ir  costs.  FinaIl.y,  r'rhiIc diff,;rcnt  ratcs  of
lndiroct  taxation  rnay  bc balanced.  by d.rawbacks  ancl  comperlsatory  taxes,
thc  common  }ifarkct commission consi-clers  that  turnovcr: trx.:s  shoulcl b.:
harrnonized.,  for  thrcc  scparatu sets  of  r.-,asons. First,  tlre existing
systcms d.o  not  p:r'rlnit of  any corrcct  calculation  of  drarvba.ck  ancl  con-
pc'nsatory tax-s,  aud thc  method.s  of  calcu-lation  cliff'cr  from coutltry  to
country.  Both of  thcsc  facts  night  l+eucl  tc  'd.istortion".  s.:condly,
th.  rnajority  of  thcsc  systerns  (thc  muttistag-  cascade  systoms) ti:nd,  to
favour  vcrtically  cotrccntratod ind.ustriis  a.nd  hr;ncc  rosult  in  discri-
mination  butwuen  intcgrated. un not-inti:gratcd.  cntcrpriscs.  Thircily,
th,-' systems  of  d.ravrback  and compcnsfitory  taxes  l:'llt,k,j  riu\cjss&ry thc  main-
tenancc of  taxation  frontiers  a.nci-  hcnc..-  consiclcrablo  forncrlitics  for
trad.e across  Stat-  bord"ors vrithin  tho  Cornnunity.  Ilocr.r,tls'.￿  of  thc  uspe-
cially  disturbing  cffect  of  changcs  itt  tirc loverl of  componsating  taxes
and d'ravtbacks  otr the  trad.c betwoen rncnber countrics,  ilr.  Council  of  l,li-
nisters  this  summer  acccpted the prlnciplc  that  ths  Conrnission  and  obhcr
lilcmbor  Statos  should  be consultad  bcfora  any such changes aro  rnad.e.
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If  the  problont of  rrd.isto:rtionrr is  thus  somor;hat  conplex,  the  third.
ancl  fourth  principles  I  msntioned.  earlier  aro  relatlvoly  slmplo.  The @
oR'new reslligti-o.rs  agl  c\.lg&.!iggg,  of  competition  is  olear1y  stated.  in
a number  of  Articlos  of  the  Romo  Troaty.  (.Arttclo  12 prohibits  new ous-
torn  tluties  on imports  or  oxports,  as nel1  as the  increase  of  such d,uties;
Arrticle  31 prohibits  now quantltative  restriotions.  Artiole  53lforbids
new restrictions  on the  right  of  ostablishrnent  g Article  62, new restric-
tlons  on the  supply of  servj"oes. Alticle  ?1,  on capital  movements,  is
naturally  more cautious:  but  it  pledges  l.{omber  S'tates to  endeavour to
avoid  lncreasing  restrictions.  Alticls  93 obliges  l,iornber  States  t.o noti_
fy  the  Commission  of  eny p::ojc:t  to:cd:f;r  Sta'bes  aid.s or  introduce  nor.r
oness if  the  Commission  considers  such a plan  incornpatible rvith the
Common  Market,  lt  must at  once initiate  formal  exaniine.tion, the  effect
of  rvhlch is  to  suspend the  implementation  of  the  proposed me&suros.
A similai  more general  provisj.on  in  Article  102, covers  logislation  or
any ad.ministrative  measuro; vrhile  Artioles  B)  anri.  86,  conccrned.  with
private  restrictj.ons  and.  distortiono,  al.so oover. futur:,  instansos  as
well  as existing  cases).
The last  of  the  four  prin..::'.i1es l..mentionec1  was to  the  effect
that  restT]stiolgiug.d.=11fu$.qg!iogp-o.L-oo-upg-t-*.t-tq,r-qr-e-iq.rbidd,ggr_llhql-llJq1
th-eir lesal  form. This is  also $airly  c1earfitseIf,  and.  indeed is  n|_|
ted  at  ln  several  of  the  Articles  of  th.e Treaty  which refer  to  nmeasu-
res  of  equivalent  effectrr.  Ivloreover, there  is  a rqell-l<nown  legal  maxim
that  when  ppplying  a legal  rule  to  a situation  defined  in  that;:rule,
one nust  not  allow  oneself  to  bo led  astray  by  legal  constructions  cif the
situation  resting  on a subord.inato bod.y  of  1arv"  This  maxirn  is  of  consi-
d'elable  importanco,  I  think,  in  suoh fields  as criminal  Law and fisoal
lawl  where ono doos not  let  oneself  bo oonfusecl  by  ooncepts of  civil
law  on the  underlyirls  facts.unless  tho  Laru  refors  to  themc the  relevant
ruleg  ale  genorally  applied  to  th.e fe.ot;s of  the  case,  without  referenoe
to  such concepts.  fhis  same  pririciple  was in  faot  snunciatetl  for  inte:e-
national  law  in  relation  to  national  lar,r as far  back as  1926, whon the
w  / tlts/60-t 1  i6'--  .l.o - rv  lSrrs/60-A
Permenent  Court of  Justice  dealt  rvith the  caso
Pollsh  Upper Silesia.
oi  Oerman  assets in
rft  thereforel  my first  three  principles  had reatiy  been ivritten
into  tbree  provisions  of  the liome  Treaty,  the fourth  principle  woulcl  be
superfbus,  sinco  it  would alread.y'  follorr' from the  g-enera1  principles
for  the  interpretation  of  intematioriaL  law.  But in  fact  my three'p:rin-
ciples  are scattered  th::oughout the  Treaty  in  more than sixty  different
Articlss;  ancl  it  is  not  always oaey to  decids which specific  provision
should-  be invokod.  in  a speclfic  c&se. which one is  invoked.  may'be of
consid.erable irnportance, owing to  the varying  rules  in  each Articre
regard-ing  competence,  proced.ures,  time-1imits,  etc.  However,  it  is
clear  from the  Treaty  that  action  must be taken not  only  against  one
or  soveral forms of  restriction  or d.istortion  of  competition,  but
against  all,  and.  against  all  with  equal vigour.  Tn practicer'the
fourth  principle  may  prove therefore  to  be very  important,  since  it
may  well  leadl to  the  conclusion  that  alrnost -arly  restriction  or  d.istor-
tion  of  competltion  may  give  a lawyer e-nd  his  client  some  grounds for
aotion.  rn  parenthesis,  r  might perhaps remind you that  this  applies
not  only  to  enterprises  of  common  liiarket origin,  but  also  to  any
others  that  have established.  branches within  the  territory  of  the
cominunity. The fourilr  principle  is  also  impOrtant  from  the  general
point  of  view of  policy-making,  berause it  calls  for  a high  d.egree  of
coordination  in  the  activities  of  the  Community.  Acceleration  in  the
establishment  of -the  Common  lvlarket, for  instance,  shopld. not  be and.
will  not  be restricted,  to  the more rapid  oriminrtionTl"=tain  1egal
forms of  restriction  or  d.istortlon  of  competitlon,  but  should and.
will  as far  as possible  cover all  field.s.  Thus, for  instance,  the
Commission  will  submit to  the  Council of  lvlinisters before  the  ftrst
of  November  a first  set  of  very  important  rules  fo:r  the  implementation
of  the Treatyrs rulss  on restrictive  pracfisss.
I  have spoken for  some  -bime
moment  now to  sey something about
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about  prj.nciples'r  it  is  pe:rhaps the
practioo.  Fi::ste  what  is  happening
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within  ths  aroa of  the  Common  Market itsoLf ,  anrl.second.ly,  what is  11re
commission  aotually  d.oing  in  tho fieLd  of  compotition policy  ?'
0n the  first  Doint,  T noorl r.rot  dotain  you very  long.  you are  no
cloubt as fermiliar  es I  am  i:ith  tbo  oxtlaord.inary  spurt  in  businsss
activity  which has tar.con  place  a]-rcc"Cy:rithin thc  Cor.mon  l,lart<et.  tt
would"  be gratifying  for  us,  as European bu:reaucrats,  to  be abl.e to  take
the  credit  for  some  of  this  s'i;inulus  s but  in  f'act  I  a:n  convincecl that
much of  the  reason  is  p;;ycho1ogica1. Tn 1959, as Jrou  lcnor.r,  the  valu.e
of  trade  be'Lween  tho  six  cou-ntries,  as cor'))a:lod"  r-rith the  correspond.ing
period.g of  1pl8,  roue by  1.6/o  in  i;he seoond-  qualter,  Zzy'c  i1  the  third,
and.  2)/o in  the  four-i;h qrreir.Ler,.  'r't,r,  .fire liiroj-e year  .bhq i.,.--.,er&ge  increase
$as  1)/o ovet  1958 arrd.  15,1  over  1957. During  bhe first  six  ilonths  of
this  year,  the  same  d.evelopnen'b  con'',;inrlecL.  In  morrcy  terms,  gre  totai
value  of  trad.e r.riihin  ihe  comrnrrnity  in  19)!  vas, $ aro77 r,ri1Lions,
compared  r,rith $l 62787  millions  in'l9FB  ar.rcl  {f T,OJ0 millions  in  19lj1  ,
In  these  figures  )'oll cetn  see the  eifects  of  economic reoovery  last  year
after  tho  slight  reeession  in  lgisc  you may  arso,  perha-r;;, attribute
a small  Part  of  the  i;rad.€  rilotro.irse  to  -bhe  1Q'i irr  bcrnal  ta.rrff  cut  anti.
the  first  quo'ba  enlargrn:nt  r.rhj-ch  'coo!<  placo  cn January  |,  {95g, But  thi-s
lowering  of  the  bar:rj ers  d-oes  not  in  i-l;se1f esplain  the  r..ihoie  i.norease
in  intra-Conmunity  trad.c; norr  of  corrrse, 
'd.ocs 
it  directly  aicount  for
the  lcsser,  but  s'bi,r-l  very  sign::-ficant,  incre.Lse in  imports' :-nto the
Community  from  outsicle.  Ilha'i;  I  ruhink has been happeirirrg is  tlat  busi-
nessr  to  use a s;omo'trha.t  loose  expression,  has been t'pnti;ing i-bs money
on  the  common  i{arketil,  ancl  g-.n--t-i.c-ip3rt4.tg  ciie rarge  home market  vrhich
wilt  have been estelblishecL  when all  tire  barrier's  are  cLor.rn.  This  means  :
that  already  thero  has been gleater  compo'iitic'n vrithj,n the  Conmon
Market,  as indur:tries  which  trarlitionarly  supply  only  -  or  ).ai,geI;r -
their  national  ma:rllets  have been putting  out  feo.r.els in.bo those  of
their  Common  I'{a:rket  noighbours.
tlPutf,ing out  fee_!.ersu...  .  f  sboulrl like
that  phraso.  In  many  oose6, I  an sule,  i.b neans
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to  stop  for  a moment  at
only  that  fir.ns  he.ve
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cteolclod'  to  oompotg tn  nolghbourinfd markots,  to  eot  up salos  agents,  to
'  inoreaso  their  investmonts  aocord.ingiy,  porhaps to  form mergers.  So far
so good.  B|t 
.rn other  oa,sesr it  may  wetl  bo a d.,ifforent  story.  It  may ..-
well  bo that  firms  cl.eoid.g.to  join  fed.srationsr..nev.gr.oupings; special
arlangornente -  perhaps cartels.  In  facty  ,verf  many  groi:pings  have
occumed sinco  the  Common  Marketrs ins'titutions  were first  set  up;
so many tbat  it  ls  impossible  f,ol  ne to  list  thom here.  l{any of  them,
so far  as we can tell  at  the.momentl ar.e  legitimate  rna u.rul d.esirabie -
specialisatiotl  agreements, for  examplo, nhose offect  might  ttoenable
a firm  in  one country  to  compete  more effeotively,on'a  neighbtiuring
market,  while  at  the  same tilne  enoguraglng just  that  reorganisation  of
ind'ustrial  structure  whiqh ls  ons of  the  aims of  the'Common..Market. ',  '
But not  all  agreements  are so harmless or  so benefleial.  What, there-
fore,  is  the  Common  Irlarket Commission  d.oing about  thom, as well  as
arou,t the  other  baTriers  to  compe.tition  anti distortions  of  comfueti-
tion  rvhich f  mentloned earli.er  ?
x'irst  let  me say'r in  parenthbsis,  that  the  Commissioh  ias  fuw
diTigigte  weapons  at  its  d.isposal. for  any'g;enoral regulatiol  oi  th"
'  matkst.  Agriculture  is  to  some  d.egroe  an exoeption  to  thls  statement,
gs,is  transport  poliay,  ancl  to'a  losser  d-ei5ree  social  policy,  But in
generale the  Cornmissionts  pollets are of  ths  indirect  kintl.-  monetarypolicyy
qrclical  poricy,,  and-  so on;  ancr  its  ro1o,  as is  perhaps pxoper  rn  a basioally
-  f.reetenterprise  eoonomyi is  to  hold  the  rlng  rathor  tu*  to  fight  in
the  arena.  If  'this  soems  a somerrihat'Adam  Srnithian economic philosophy,
I  sbould perhaps ad.d.  that  the  Commissionrs'compet,ition'policy j.s in
,  som€ d"egpee  an 'attempt  'to  supply  the  famous .rrhidd.dn  hanrl.'r  which  ear-
1i3r  pbilosophgrs  oonfid.ecr.  to  a benevoront Delty.l
This  tei-ng so,  the  Commissionls  first  task  in  the  anti-tbust
'  fieltl'  was to  oluoidato,  as I  tried  lto do  r:arlier,  the  somowhat  com-
plioatecl  rules  laid  d.own  in  the  Troaty.  The most controvorsial  problem
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'  herei't as you nay'romember',  was to  know whsthsr  or  not  Articlos  gf  and
86''dlready had'  dhe foroo  of  apprieable  law.  After  some  d.lscussion,
national'  er:perts came  to  agroe with  tbc  commission  that  ttris  was in
faot  the  caso. A fu::ther  p::oblem  arising  from this  was to know whether,
this  being the  o&sor oxisting  agrooments  falling  und.er  tho  ban of  Arti-
cle  B5 were butomatically  nulr  and void.,  or  whether  a further  oourt
vord'i'cte  or  the  d'ecision  of  an administrative  autho::ity  was necessary
in'each  particurar  case,  raying  down  that  the  agreement  in  question
actually  meets tho  criteria  of  Article  B!.  Both views havo in  faot
been defondod: the  commission  has not  pronounced.  on the  subject.  For
myself,  d'espite the  fascination  of  the problem, r  feel  that  it  is  of
only  second.ary  importance in  actual  practice  -  largely  becauso  prac-
tical  experiencc in  the fierd  of  anti-trust-policy  makes  it  c1ear,
that  generally  speaking re'f,ajs'b1ve practices  onr.y  actually  cegse
after  an officiar  debision  against  them, even if  they were already
in  princ:.pIe  nu1l  ancl  void..
A third  problem of  intcrprotation  concer.ns the  pra.ctlcal  con-
tent  of  Articles  B)  and 86,  partly  owing to  different  conciitions of
competition  as betwcen Nomber  statos,  partly  owi4g to  their  difforing
1ega1 trad-itions,  and partly  because  of  the  difficulty  of  clecid.ing
tle  precis.e meani'g  of  ,advelse  ef*ucts  on trad.e between Member
cogntries'r,  vrhioh is  tho basic  criterion  for  inad.nissibility  of .the
arTangcments  in  question.  Those  probrems, r  think,  wirl  only  be sor-
ved co4paratively  slowly  and largely  by  the  gradual  d.evelopment  of
practioal  jurisprud.once. IIore,  for  once, continental  logar  practi.co
may have 'somothing to  learn  from  the  English  case_lar.r  tradition.
'  A foulth  difficulty  arises  from  tho  fact  that  when the  Treaty
came into  force  only  three'of  its  l,iember  states  -  tr'bancel the  FecL4.raI
Republii,  and'  the Nethorlands  -  possesssd cartel  regislatlon  ancl  actmi-
nistrativo  authoritlss  to  oa'ly  it  out.  Tho d.ifficulty  here  was not,
of  course,  the  rack  of  substantivo  law,  sinco  this  is  found.  in  the
Tleaty'  But  in  the  abseuce of  implemontation  rul.es under Article  BJ,
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natlona]  logislation  hat,s-stjj.11  to  provid.o for  compotent  .authoritioo,
rulos  of  proood.uro, 
''and 
sarotions  othor  than the  san"tion  of  nuffiiy
cbnt'dlned in  Artiolo'S5'(2).  To o.un,"dy  the  absenco  ef  thsso oosentials, ' 
I  .  .r
thd 
"Commilsion 
re.qriust'oa  :bh.,  go.ru"nmsnts  of  ltaly,  Belgium ancl  Luxem-
-  tl
liourg  to  btl'opt tho  necossar^y  logislat{on.  Bolgium has alread.y d.ono  so.
'  In  ftaly  and Luxembourg, Bills  alo  now irr  preparation.  trinal1y,  0loro-
'  '  :""i1.':
over,  as r  mentionod.  already,  tho  cornmission  itsolf  is  preparing  to  ,,
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submit to  the  Counoil bofore  tho boginning  of  Novombor,  its  flrst,
set  of  clraft  regulatiohs.  unrlsr Ar.ticle  BJ,  wbi.ch  will  help  to. onsure
effoctive  and uniform  applioation  of  Alticlss  B!  and 86 throughout
thd  ldember  States.  The'proposals uncler discussion  includ,e that  of
c.ompulso}y  registration  for  soms  particulary  important  types  of  agroe-
mdnt.
; '  'l'ho importance  of  having  a gniform  legime  throughout  the  'Member
Sti:t::  indeed clesorves  special  emphasis. Rulos of  oompetition,  howc-
ver  iroll-conceived.,  which d.iffered. from  ono part  of  the  Comnunity to
another  would.  of  course be worse thari useless  -  since  they  wou1d.  fos-
'ter  that  vory  d.istoltion  of  competitive  conrlitions  wtriltr  it'is  one
'of  their  objocts  to  eliminate.  Therefore,  even b'efore any case has
oomo  to "tho  Community  Court  of  Justioe,  and.  even before  the  promul-
'gation  of  lmplementing regulations  under Arbicle  Bl,  the  Commission
has'deBmed  i.t  essenti'al  to  maintain  close  though iniormal  c'nt&ct
"with  nat'iohal'authorities',  to  co-ordinato  enquiries'  and.  tho  examina-
-tion  of  spocific  casss -  without,  of  course,  projud.icing  the  formal
cLivisions of.'comfetence whlch exist  and irhioh will  exist  betne'on  tho
national  authoritios  and tho  various  organs of  tho  Community  itself.
In  practicor:  complaints  about restricti.ve'  practices  can be ad.drossod.
either  to  the national  authoritios  or  to  the  Commission.  Direct  refe-
3ono9 to,the  national  oourts  is  not  in  most cages atl.visoable, sinoe
aarini"trativs  enforcemont is  the  normar rulcealthougi,PtS"l  nationar  court
-.4s  _ rv/  5ya/60-aI
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is  usually  possibl-e, and the communityrs  court  of  Justloo  is
alwayo,  availabLe  as a final  court  of  Appear for  thoso  oa,ses
falling  within  its  jurisd.iotion.  As the national  bar^riers within
tlro 0ommon  Market gratlua).ly fa}l,  suoh casos -  tha,t is,  t,ho in-
ternationar  oases -  are  likely  to  beoome  more numerous, and
puroJ.y  national  cases probably  l_egs  so.
The commission has alreariy  in  fact  be,3un  to  invostigate
soveral  of  these cases;  but  -  if  you will  forgive  mo  -  r  d.o  not
propose to  go into  detai]  about them hsre.  But r  should,  r  think,
add that  in  the  draft rulos  which wo are  preparing  we may  well
includ.e regulations  to  oover  oases which oannot be examined.  trn-
der Artiole  Bl  (r)  or  (3)  uooause  they have not  come  to  tho
attention  of  the oompetent  authority  through registration  or
througir a request  for  authorization,
so far,  r  have spoken ohiefly  about the commissionrs concern
with  Articlos  B! and 86,  covoring private  cartel  arrangements.
3ut  thc  commission has already  begun d.iscussions with  Member
states  on the applioation  of  Article  !0,  conoerned.  with  public
undertakings;  and it  is  busy also  on probloms of  d"umping,  state
aldsr  the  approximation of  laws,  and fiscal  provisions.  perhaps
in  conclusion,  Mr'. chairman,  it  may be -in  order  to  say a few word.s
about  oach of  these  in  turn.
Dumplngr of  cours.e, is  another  of  those  economic te:lms whlch
are  the  lawyerrs  parad.ise and his  clientts  hell.  The Conmission,
r  haston to  say,  has.not  atternpted.  an arbitrary  dsflnition,  but  is
using  as a working,basis  ths  dofinltion  (based.  on double pricing)
of  Article  vr  in  the  Gsneral Agreomont on Tariffs  and rrad.e.  such
aumping is  to  be condemnod.  if  it  causes or  threatens  to  cause
material  injury  to  an industry  in  the  i.mporting  country  or  if  it
materially  retards  the  rlovolopment of  a  d.omestic ind.ustry.  rn
agTeement  with  Government  extrlertsl  it  h&s been sottl.ed. that  the
commission shall  have the  powor of  approciation  and.  action  in
,/.
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d,ation  to  ooass and doerlstr  but  which may inol-ude the  aubhorisa- ,,i.:
tlotr  of  defonsivo measuroco,  As a gonorol  moaguro, the cornmuntty
haii institutod  a  rrboomoran6lr'  proogd.uro, nrade  possiblo  by Ar'bic1s
9f  (a)  of  tho  Ilonre  Troatye  vhioh  canre  into  force  on r\pril  llth
this  year.  uncler this  sysbem, ci.rirnpod.  goocls  may  bo rt,3-exported.  to
tho  dumping country  froo  of  cluty.  In  this  gonoral  fiold.,  a
numbbr of  oases aro  alrsarly  rrnd.er  study,  although  in  sorno  in-
stanoes  investigation  has l€d. to  the .rvithdrawal af  the  original
' oomplaint.'
0n the  questlorj  of  State  aid.s,  nuch prolimina.ry  rrcrrk  has
centred  on 'blie  problems I  mentior:erl.  at  the  beginning  of  my tallc
-  that  isr  the bordor'lino  bebtreen  spocific  state  aids  and.  genoral
measures  r'rhich  fall  into  otlter  categories  of  tho Treatyrs  provisions.
'This  question  of  inte:rpreta.bion, hovrover,  is  only  the  first  pro-
' bren.  .fjqually  lmprirtdnt,  in  my  viei.r,  is  that  of  notification
proced.ure, whereby  -the ltlember  Sta'bes  deolaro'to  the'Commission
both existing  snd:anf, projeeted  aids  appltcable  by each'country.
This  is  particularly  important  in  the  casc 
'of projecteri  aids,
sinee  the  c.ommission  must'have  'bime  to  form'ia reasoned.,  jud.gment
on their'scoBe  and.  lilcely  e'iftct,  in  ord.er to  assr:ss their  com-
patibility  with'thu  Tr'eaty. At  thc  same  ti'me, special  studies
az:q  be-ing mad.e.of  spocial  cases, ,of  whioh  tho  moq.l-  i_mportant
,inq!.ance is  aid.s to  shiptruildi.ng.  And already  practioal  measures
\av.e boen takcn  in  cortain  cases.  In  ono case, .ilro.  Comnrission
suggested,  ,mgdifigations.  tq  cortain  Bolgian  measuros for  the  en-
cgunagJment.of inves'tmentsl  and in  anothcr  it  sugg.,estccl  amcndments
to  a Frcnqh decrce 'bo  aid  ind.ustries  rvhich install  cortain
!,rn.9" of  oquipment good.s. r  may add that  in  therse instances,
.the  commissionts  sug['estions  wero takon  irrto  acoount.  In  a  third.
casre  the  government ooncorncd.  d.eoid,ecl.  to  aborish  the  aid. .alto-
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Tho approximatioir  of  Laws is  a  oubject  that  fcills  und,or
spoolfio  and gencrar provisions  of  tho Roms  Troaty,  tho  latter
bolng  in  lrartiourar  Articlos  lol  and Loz.  rn  addition,  laws may
also  btl np1:roxirhatod.  by intor.national  convi.rntionl Articlb  ?20
lists  soveral  subjocts  ad e mattor.of  prioiity.  tror tho momont,
tho comrnission  is  taking  action  chiofry  ln  some  half-dozon
separato fieldsr  Tho first  concerns the protectibn  of  in-
dustrial  proporty,  whcro there  riirl  be either  a harmonisation
of  existing  municipal  law  or  the  establlshmsnt  of  a community
oonvontion  on patonts,  trad.omarks, gto.  -  or  a comilination  of
the  trvo;  Ittr, Froschmayer  of  my d.epartmont has arroady  given  yqu
some  d.otails  on 'bhis sub.jeot.  A seoond.  field.  in  r.rhich tlre
Commission  has been activetis  that  of  publlc cont::acts,
whero it  is  sgoking.to  elimirqate restriction  and.  discrimination
in  the  matter  of  tend.ors,  a iliird.  concorns  tochnicar  and.  adrni.n-
istrativo  obstacr.os  to  trad.e, i'cruding  veterinary  .roEulations,
foodstuffs  control,  pharmaocutical rules;  and regulations  for
lndustrial,htiaLilr  and safety;  a fourth  covers  ruios  concerning
discountsr  prenia,  and surplus  stock  disposal;  d;  fifth  tha
uniform  rooognition  a.nd.  execution  of  judicial  decisions  and.
atvards in  civil  and commercial matters;  finally  come  arbitration
larv and company  1aw. 0f  these maniford tasks,  it  soems  rikely
that  four  at  lsast  _ those.conc,3Tning  the protoction  of  industrial
proportyp  tho reoognltion  and execution  of  judicial  declsionsl,
arbitretion,  and company  raw -  may  bo,aocomplishod. by moans  of
intornatiorral  corrventions  .
f  havo left  until  last  tire question  of _!!scal provisions;
part1ybtlcausoofitsimportancrs,an{n"o,,￿ffi.-
d'ifficulty.  As r  said  earrier  in  this  talk,  thc  problom of
tu'rovor  taxes  is  among  tho  most pressing;  a*d. rrore the
council  of  lilirristors  has alroarly  accopted. tho  cornmigsi.onrs  pro-
posal  that  rebatos  and.,  cornponsatory taxes  shall  not  bc 
'modified.
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wlthout  pr.ior  consultatiorr  of  ilro Commtssion  nnd.  of  tho
othor  Mornbor-states, tc  all  of  whom  roa,sons  wlrl  havs to  bo
subrni.ttod :t'or tho  proposed.  change. But  in  ad"d.itio',  wo bi:}iov.
that  so .lo'g as turnovor  'baxes  ruinain unharmonisqdr  tho  six
Governmerrts  nirl  h*v.l to  co-opor.ate  closely  if  the advantagos
of  the  common  r{arket  aro  not  to  be ondilngered..  only  aftor
srich harmonisation rvi]l  thr: ful]  b,.rnefits in  fact  bi  fe1t,
Joint  rvorking groups are  at  prescnt  studying  the various  nloans
of  aohievirrg harmonisation,  inolucling a singlv  genoral  tax just
before  tho  retail  stage,  a singlc  tax  at  the prod.uction stagoe
or  an addod  value  tax -  in  cacrr  caso vrith  the possibility  of
slightly  varylng  suppl.umenta'y taxos  at  a  row r.evel to  be
decldod by eactr  Mombur  state.  I{e are hoping to  submit concreto
proposaLs on this  subject  d.uring lgd1.  I,{eann}riJc,  a crose
t'ratch is  beirig  kept  upon.  othor  aspects  of  the  fi,sc*}  problern,
closely  bourrd  up with  that  already me'iio'ecrl  irrcl*cting coun-
to'vailing  dutics  and.  cr.rawbacrs,  othe'  indircoL  taxos,  and the
substitution  of' fiscal  cus'boms  duties  by  exci.se d.uties.  This
last  poin'b is  of  paeticular'  ,ilnporl.1nco  io  .Liio  consumor, who
may  woll  feoL  that  if  such ,::xcisu  ctutics replac;  the  tariff
he alread-y paid,  bhe bensfits  to  hlm of  ilro  conmon  lr{aricct  are
to  somo  cxtont  boing  siphoni:d off  b,:forc  hc can cnjo;r  fli*:m.
r  could  go on stirl  furthers  but  it  seems  to  mc tha.5  r  have
tr(Jspasssd 10ng enough upon your  patival.lco. rnd.eecl,  it  is  porhap,s
fitting  iliat  r  srrour.d  olose  ilris  introd.ucto'y  spooch uy comi.ng
back onoo more to  ure  rionsurn{i}  ancl  what hc cxpects  of  tire
common  Markot.  rt  ls  hev in  fact,  who stands to  benof.it mos.b
obviously  from  ou'  compdtitioi:  poricy;  but  ho d.ocs  not. stand.
to  beriefit  a1one. Firms,  oovorrcrnents, worrrers  -  all  arike  norld.
tho  guarante..rs  and.  benefits  of  a clear-cut  a^d uniform  policy.
And wlron r  look  back at  arr  the  jur.ictical  knots  ,rat  r  h*ve
indioatod.  this  rnor:ning, r  urink  yo'  uri1I agros  ttrat  ilro  process
.of unravulling'  thtrrn  .iu prac  bicr  lril-l  providu  b..,n..f  j-ts  for  th..
communityts  lervyurs  too  srncl  porhaps  .-,v.,n  for  a numb.,r of
lawyers  outsid.o  tho  Comreon  Liarlcrrt.
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